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Mongolia: A Case for Economic Diversification
in the

Face of a Changing Climate

by Nathan Borgford-Parnell*
Introduction

I

n the past two decades Mongolia has experienced significant
environmental changes driven both by human action and
climate change. These changes have had considerable detrimental effects on Mongolia’s economy and people. Basic survival in this country of harsh climates requires a careful balance
with the environment.1 Climate change, which may exacerbate
climatic extremes, in combination with unsustainable land use
practices, have begun to change that balance and reveal Mongolia’s significant environmental vulnerabilities. In response to
these changing conditions, the Mongolian government instituted
a number of mitigating and adaptive measures to decrease its
vulnerability, but without further economic diversification the
success of these measures is limited.
Photo courtesy of Nathan Borgford-Parnell

Basic survival in this
country of harsh climates
requires a careful balance
with the environment.
In more recent years, Mongolia has begun to depend upon
its rich mineral resources to diversify its economy away from
a dependence on the more traditional vocations of herding and
animal husbandry. Although diversification is the key to Mon
golia’s future, these mining operations pose additional real
threats to Mongolia’s fragile environment and represent only
one economic alternative to animal husbandry. Mongolia’s economic diversification should include the development of renewable energy resources. Mongolia has strong, untapped wind and
solar resources in abundance and their development may help tilt
the environmental balancing act back towards sustainability.2

Climate Change on the Steppe
Climate change is making Mongolia both warmer and drier.3 Over the past sixty years, Mongolia’s mean temperature
has increased by 3.4ºF, compared to the global mean of 1ºF in
the past century.4 Rainfall is also more infrequent and heavier,
which is increasing erosion on already fragile pastureland. 5
Mongolia’s glaciers, which feed many of the country’s rivers,
have decreased in flow causing approximately fifty of the country’s rivers to vanish between 2004 and 2005.6
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The combination of these effects is causing a significant drying of Mongolia’s soil.7 Desertification has become so significant
that Mongolian dust storms are causing environmental impacts
on countries as far away as Japan.8 As of 2002, over seventy percent of Mongolia’s pastureland was considered degraded.9 This
has led to a decrease of pasture biomass of 20–30% over the past
twenty years.10 Livestock fodder production today is one third
that of 1986 production numbers.11
Mongolia’s livestock live on open pastures year-round,
making them susceptible to any severe changes in the weather,
climate, or changes in biomass. Typically, the animals build
up fat stores during the summer to help them get through the
harsh Mongolian winters. However, with the decrease in pasture
biomass it is much more difficult for the animals to build the
reserves they need.12
Mongolia depends upon the livestock industry both for
employment and basic food products. Almost fifty percent of
Mongolians are employed in animal husbandry or a related
field.13 Livestock accounts for thirty-four percent of annual gross
production and thirty percent of Mongolia’s total exports.14
However, pasture degradation brought on by climate change is
only partially to blame for these changes. Institutional and economic collapse of the Mongolian government in the early 1990s
conspired to exacerbate the damage that climate change was
already doing to Mongolia’s pasturelands.15
*Nathan Borgford-Parnell is a J.D. candidate, May 2009, at American University,
Washington College of Law. He is also the founder of Valkyrie Energy LLC, a
renewable energy development firm focusing on new and developing markets.
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The Fall of Communism and the Rise of the Herd
In 1990, Mongolia’s peaceful transition from a communist
regime to a democratic government signaled the dissolution of
the central planned economy and state-subsidized systems of
food distribution. As a result of this transition, virtually overnight thousands of Mongolians found themselves out of work.
Many Mongolian families, searching for a means of survival,
turned to traditional livestock herding to fill the economic void.
Between 1990 and 2001 the number of herding households in
Mongolia more than doubled, from 75,000 to 185,500.16 Many
of the new herding families had no experience in animal husbandry and were unaccustomed to the careful and balanced
nature of traditional nomadic herding.17
Prior to the 1990 transition, the communist government
limited the number of livestock in the country to about fifteen
million; with its dissolution and the introduction of a market
economy livestock populations grew unchecked.18 Without
centralized controls, livestock
populations ballooned until 1999
when herd populations reached
thirty-three million, more than
ten times the number of people
in Mongolia.19
The meteoric increase in
herd populations combined with
the decrease in biomass discussed
above left Mongolia supremely
vulnerable to any dramatic shift
in environmental conditions.
This vulnerability became most
evident between 1999 and 2002
when Mongolia was hit with
four historic droughts and abnormally severe winters.

Climate change deserves much of the blame for this tragic
convergence of events but its effects would have been much
more localized were it not for the unpreparedness of the Mon
golian state. The institutions of the new Mongolian state were
not prepared to manage the drastic increase in new herding families, or the dramatic changes brought about by the new market
economy. This left the government agencies unable to cope with
rapidly changing environmental conditions and the herders with
little to no capacity to adapt to the deteriorating environment.

New Institutions Not Up to the Task
In 1990 the new Mongolian state dismantled the communist
era herding collectives that had managed herd populations and
allocated pastureland for over half a century.27 The remaining
traditional and customary institutions for pasture management
could not cope with the influx of new herding families, and so
the responsibility fell to the new government.28 Stepping into
the void, the Mongolian government passed a battery of laws
and regulations seeking to lay
a foundation for environmental
protection, ease pressures on
pastureland, and strengthen the
capacities of herders to adapt to
changing conditions. Between
1990 and 2000 Mongolia passed
more than twenty laws regulating land rights and environmental standards.29
There is little question that
the Mongolian government
recognized the significance of
the problems and challenges it
faced. The real impediment is
not a lack of will, but institutional capacity. Overall coordination
between the agencies and institutions tasked with environmental
protection and pasture management was often limited.30 While
the laws were robust, the administrative procedures for implementation had no clear guidelines for dealing with administrative
overlaps.31 Agencies tasked with pasture management suffered
from a significant lack of resources, both in trained personnel and
budget.32 Nowhere was this more true than at the local level where
small community governments were tasked with the lion’s share
of environmental and pastureland management and oversight.33
Following the dzud, the Mongolian government, international donors, and multilateral institutions took action to combat
the worst effects of the disaster. In 2003 Mongolia passed the
Law on Disaster Protection, designed to improve coordination
between government and institutional actors within the context
of existing environmental and pastoral management laws.34 The
World Bank implemented the Sustainable Livelihoods Project,
designed to improve institutional capacity for pastoral risk management, develop funds for local development, and make microfinance more available to rural households.35
While significant effort has been made to mitigate and prevent future disasters, Mongolia has thus far only had limited

Desertification has
become so significant that
Mongolian dust storms
are causing environmental
impacts on countries as
far away as Japan.

Mongolia’s Longest Winter
In Mongolian dzud is a term for severe winter weather
conditions of the type that are so extreme they can prevent animals from grazing on open pastures.20 Dzud are quite common
in Mongolia, occurring typically once every seven years, but
always in localized areas.21 However, between 1999 and 2002
Mongolia experienced three dzud in sequence each covering
approximately seventy percent of the country.22 The dzud were
preceded by particularly dry summers where over three thousand water sources, including 680 rivers and 760 lakes, literally
disappeared, decimating the already stressed and low weight
livestock population.23
In four years, more than eleven million adult animals died
from the combination of extreme summer droughts and severe
winter weather.24 The loss of so many animals was devastating
to Mongolia’s herders as almost ten thousand families lost their
entire herd and seventy-five percent of the remaining families
were left with herds below maintenance levels.25 The economic
impact of the 1999–2002 dzud is estimated at over 200 million
U.S. dollars and dropped Gross Domestic Product growth to
1.1% from 3.2% in 1998.26
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success in changing the paradigm of environmental vulnerability
for its herding families. If any silver lining can be found from the
1999–2002 dzud, it is the fact that tens of thousands of herders
were forced out of the industry,
thereby decreasing pressure on
critically damaged pastureland.
Unfortunately, by 2008 herd
populations have climbed back
to their 1999 numbers, once
again threatening pastureland
with extreme overgrazing.36 As
of January 2009, 120,400 livestock have died from extreme
winter temperatures in Mongolia, nearly a seventy percent
increase from 2008; it remains
to be seen whether Mongolia’s
institutions are ready for another
hard winter.37

While mining has helped take some of the pressure off
herders, dependence on mining will only further stress Mon
golia’s fragile environment. However, under the right conditions
Mongolia’s mining growth can
be a windfall for the country,
especially if it is used to spur
new forms of development, particularly in the field of energy
generation. Mongolia should
use this opportunity to invest
in renewable energy, particularly in rural communities. As
a nation, Mongolia has strong,
proven wind and solar resources
that it has yet to tap on a commercial basis.41 The development of such resources can help
Mongolia adapt to changing
environmental conditions, spur new industry in rural communities and help shift the country away from an exclusive dependence on coal for power generation.42
Global experience has shown a strong positive correlation
between increases of stable electricity use and economic growth
in developing nations.43 Stable electrical distribution provides a
strong foundation for new commercial and industrial opportunities for small communities, as well as an increase in working
hours and productivity.44 In addition to creating a new economy
based on domestic, clean, and unlimited resources, renewable
energy development will create new jobs and facilitate development in rural communities.
Development of renewable energy will also strengthen
Mongolia’s commitment to environmental protection by
decreasing is own generation of greenhouse gasses. As energy
services come on-line in Mongolia’s rural communities, families
will have a broader range of choices in securing their economic
future. Economic diversification will strengthen local communities and local institutions, thereby improving capacity to protect
pastureland and bringing herding practices back into equilibrium with the environment. While Mongolia’s actions alone
cannot reverse the effects of climate change, giving its citizens
the economic flexibility to adapt to those changes without overburdening its already fragile, harsh environment will go a long
way towards preventing the kind of catastrophic disaster that
occurred between 1999 and 2002.

The dzud were preceded
by particularly dry
summers where over 3000
water sources, including
680 rivers and 760 lakes,
literally disappeared.

Conclusions: Economic Diversification,
the Key to Mongolia’s Future & a Role
for Renewable Energy
There are two general means of addressing the human vulnerabilities to climate change in developing countries: mitigation and adaptation.38 While the Mongolian government must
continue its progress in institution-building and environmental
protection to help mitigate human impact on the environment
it must also focus on diversifying its economy away from a
dependence on one or two industries. For Mongolia’s herders,
economic diversification is the key to decreasing their vulnerability to changing climatic conditions. Economic diversification
is an adaptive measure that will decrease herder vulnerability
to climate change by providing the ability to move away from
animal-husbandry, easing pressures on the environment and
government.
Unfortunately, the Mongolian economy has only had a limited capacity to diversify away from a dependence on herding.
The two largest industrial sectors in Mongolia today are animal
husbandry and mining of coal, gold and copper.39 The formal
mining industry is Mongolia’s fastest growing industry, currently accounting for a third of Mongolia’s economy; recent surveys of miners found that more than fifty-five percent are from
families that lost their herds during the dzud and turned to mining to survive.40
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